Compelling War Correspondents to Testify: A Prerogative of International Criminal Tribunals? by Jones, Jennifer S.
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 
Volume 15 Article 5 
1-1-2006 
Compelling War Correspondents to Testify: A Prerogative of 
International Criminal Tribunals? 
Jennifer S. Jones 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 3.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer S Jones, "Compelling War Correspondents to Testify: A Prerogative of International Criminal 
Tribunals?" (2006) 15 Dal J Leg Stud 133. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For 
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
COMPELLING WAR CORRESPONDENTS TO TESTIFY . . . 133 
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A  qualified  testimonial  privilege  for  war  correspondents  was  recognized  
by  the  Appeals  Chamber  of  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  
Former  Yugoslavia  in   the  case  of  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin.  This  article  
examines  whether  war  correspondents  should  enjoy  such  a  privilege  in  
international  criminal  tribunals.  
   The   author   illustrates   that,   to   maintain   their   legitimacy,  
international  criminal  tribunals  must  be  able  to  make  factually  accurate  
findings.  She  further  illustrates  that  the  ability  of  international  criminal  
tribunals   to  make   factually  accurate  findings   is  dependant  upon  their  
ability   to   obtain   reliable   evidence,   including   witness   testimony.   The  
suggestion  is  made  that,  as  testimonial  privileges  reduce  the  evidence  
that  is  available  to  international  criminal  tribunals,  and  thereby  impair  
the   tribunals’   fact-­finding   abilities,   they   should   be   granted   sparingly  
and  construed  narrowly.  
   The  author  recognizes  that  it  is  necessary  to  protect  the  public  
interest   in   the  work   of  war   correspondents   and   acknowledges   that   a  
testimonial  privilege  may  be  necessary  to  protect  war  correspondents  
from  being  compelled  to  testify  about  confidential  sources  and  materials.  
She  argues,  however,  that  the  qualified  testimonial  privilege  established  
in  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  –  which  seeks  to  protect  war  correspondents  
from   being   compelled   to   testify   about   non-­confidential   sources   and  
materials  –  is  unwarranted.  In  the  author’s  opinion,  measures  short  of  
a  testimonial  privilege  will  suffice  to  avoid  any  adverse  consequences  
that  might   flow   from   compelling  war   correspondents   to   testify   about  
non-­confidential  sources.
† LL.M. Candidate, 2006, Dalhousie University; LL.B., 2002, University of Alberta; 
B.A., 1999, University of Alberta. Member of the Alberta Bar
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INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the issue of whether international criminal tribu-
nals ought to recognize a testimonial privilege for war correspondents.1 
The issue is important because testimonial privileges, when construed 
too broadly, can threaten the legitimacy of international criminal tri-
bunals. Part I of this article introduces the three existing international 
criminal tribunals. It describes the roles the international community 
has assigned to them and some of the goals it is hoped their proceedings 
might serve. Part I also introduces the idea that the success of interna-
tional criminal tribunals hinges on their ability to make factually accu-
rate  findings.  Part  II  involves  a  discussion  of  witness  testimony  before  
international criminal tribunals. It illustrates that witnesses are a crucial 
source of evidence in international criminal proceedings and examines 
the power that international criminal tribunals have been given to com-
pel witness testimony. Part II also demonstrates that, in order to protect 
certain interests and relationships, international criminal tribunals have 
seen  fit  to  grant  testimonial  privileges  to  some  individuals  and  classes  
of  people.  Part  III  offers  a  detailed  review  of  the  Randal  case,  the  first  
and only case to consider whether international criminal tribunals can 
compel the testimony of war correspondents.2 The case is critiqued and 
consideration   is   given   to   whether   the   qualified   testimonial   privilege  
it created should be adopted by the recently established International 
Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC). Finally, Part IV advances the argu-
ment that, while a testimonial privilege is necessary to protect war cor-
respondents  from  being  compelled  to  testify  about  confidential  sources  
and  materials,  measures  short  of  a  testimonial  privilege  will  suffice  to  
avoid  the  adverse  consequences  that  might  flow  from  compelling  war  
correspondents  to  testify  about  non-­confidential  sources  and  materials.  
1  In this paper the term ‘war correspondents’ will be used to refer to journalists who 
report,  or  investigate  for  the  purpose  of  reporting,  directly  from  conflict  zones.
2  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (11 December 2002), Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, Decision 
on Interlocutory Appeal (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) [Randal Case].
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I. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
1. Roles Assigned to International Criminal Tribunals
At present, there are three international criminal tribunals: the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY), 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR) and 
the ICC.3 All three tribunals are designed to end impunity, and enhance 
accountability, for major international crimes.4 The ICTY has been 
charged with the task of prosecuting those “persons responsible for seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law committed in the terri-
tory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.”5 It has jurisdiction to try al-
leged perpetrators of: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.6 The ICTR has been charged with the task of prosecuting those 
“persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitar-
ian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens re-
sponsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring 
States” between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.7 It has juris-
diction to try alleged perpetrators of: genocide, crimes against humanity 
and violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol II.8 Finally, the ICC has been charged with the 
task of prosecuting those responsible for “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole,” namely: the crime 
3  There are also hybrid (national/international) criminal tribunals, like the Special 
Court for the Sierra Leone, which apply both domestic and international law and 
involve both domestic and international actors.  Such tribunals, however, are beyond 
the ambit of this paper.
4  Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International  Criminal  Evidence  (New 
York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002) xiii.
5  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  Former  Yugoslavia, UN 
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th Mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), art. 1 [ICTY Statute].
6  Ibid.  arts. 2-5.
7  Statute  for  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  Rwanda,  UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 
3453d Mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 1 [ICTR Statute].  
8  Ibid. arts. 2-4.
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of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of ag-
gression.9   
2. Goals Served by International Criminal Proceedings
A number of important goals can be served by having perpetrators of 
major international crimes tried before international criminal tribunals. 
First,   international   criminal  proceedings  “can  be  highly   significant   to  
the victims of atrocities.”10 By acknowledging the suffering that victims 
have endured, international criminal proceedings can provide victims, 
and their relatives and friends, with a sense of justice and closure.11 Sec-
ond, international criminal proceedings can contribute to the restoration 
and maintenance of peace by working to repair the damage done to 
societies “traumatized by massive human rights violations.”12 Interna-
tional criminal proceedings can legitimize contested facts and thereby 
make  it  “difficult  for  individuals  and  society  to  take  refuge  in  denial  and  
avoid the truth.”13 They can also individualize guilt and thus preclude 
the “demonisation of entire nations or groups.”14 Third, by sending a 
clear message that the commission of major international crimes will 
not be tolerated, international criminal proceedings can serve to deter 
future crimes.15  Finally, international criminal proceedings can help en-
9  Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Court,  17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 
art. 5 [ICC Statute].
10  Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, Accountability  for  Human  Rights  Atrocities  
in  International  Law:  Beyond  the  Nuremburg  Legacy,  2d ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) at 155.
11  Eric Stover, The  Witnesses:  War  Crimes  and  the  Promise  of  Justice  in  The  Hague  
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) at 12.
12  Ratner & Abrams, supra  note 10.
13  Stover, supra  note 11.
14  Kelly Buchanan, “Freedom of Expression and International Criminal Law: An 
Analysis of the Decision to Create a Testimonial Privilege for Journalists” (2004) 35 
V.U.W.L.R. 609 at 636.
15  Emily A. Berman, “In Pursuit of Accountability: The Red Cross, War 
Correspondents, and Evidentiary Privileges in International Criminal Tribunals” 
(2005) 80 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 241 at 249.
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sure that those who commit major international crimes are appropriately 
punished.16  
3. The Importance of Factually Accurate Findings 
It is of primary importance that, when adjudicating allegations of ma-
jor international crimes, international criminal tribunals determine the 
facts that gave rise to the allegations “with the greatest degree of accu-
racy possible.”17 If international criminal tribunals fail to make factually 
accurate  findings,   their   decisions  will  most   certainly   be   questioned.18 
Worse,   their   factually-­flawed  findings  might   lead   to  unjust   results  or,  
at the very least, create a perception that justice has not been served.19 
This, in turn, might threaten the legitimacy of international criminal tri-
bunals and forfeit the possibility that they will serve the lofty goals out-
lined above. In light of the need for international criminal tribunals to 
make  factually  accurate  findings,  it  is  essential  that  they  have  the  ability  
to obtain relevant and truthful evidence.20  
II.WITNESS TESTIMONY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS
1. The Importance of Witness Testimony
As in domestic criminal proceedings, witnesses are an important source 
of evidence in international criminal proceedings.21 In fact, witness tes-
timony often plays a crucial role in the prosecution of major internation-
al crimes.22 In most cases before the ICTY, for example, the testimony 
of a substantial number of witnesses has been required to prove that 
16  Ratner & Abrams, supra  note 10.
17  Gregory A. McClelland, “A Non-Adversary Approach to International Criminal 
Tribunals” (2002) 26 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 1 at 5. 
18  Ibid.
19  McClelland, supra  note 17.
20  Buchanan, supra  note 14 at 637.
21  May & Wierda, supra  note 4 at 163.
22  Berman, supra  note 15 at 245.
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major international crimes were committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia.23 That the ICTY has had to make “lavish use of witness 
testimony” is supported by statistics.24  Nearly  1,000  witnesses  testified  
before the tribunal between January 1, 1998 and July 1, 2001.25 In the 
Krstić26 case alone, which involved only a single accused, the testimony 
of 117 witnesses was required.27 The fact that perpetrators of atrocities 
in the former Yugoslavia “left few paper trails behind” might explain 
why witness testimony has proven to be such a vital source of evidence 
in trials before the ICTY.28 Whatever the explanation, there is no doubt 
that witnesses are “the lifeblood of ICTY trials.”29 
Like the ICTY, the ICTR relies heavily on witness testimony. Wit-
ness testimony has been crucial to the determination of the guilt or inno-
cence of accused persons who have been tried before the ICTR.30 While 
the ICC has yet to try a case, it seems more than likely that it too will 
have to rely heavily on the testimony of witnesses.31  
2. The Power to Compel Witness Testimony
Because witnesses are such an important source of evidence in inter-
national criminal proceedings, it is essential that “those witnesses most 
likely to have probative evidence” are available to international crimi-
nal tribunals.32 Unfortunately, witnesses are often either unavailable 
to international criminal tribunals or reluctant to give testimony, and 
subject themselves to “the rigors of cross-examination,” before interna-
23  Patricia M. Wald, “Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the 
Yugoslav Tribunal” (2002) 5 Yale Human Rts. & Dev. L.J. 217 at 219.
24  Ibid. at 217.
25  Wald, supra  note 23.
26  Prosecutor  v.  Krstić  (2 August 2001), Case No. IT-98-33 (International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I), online: United Nations <http://
www.un.org/icty/>.
27  Wald, supra  note 23.
28  Wald, supra  note 23 at 219-220.
29  Wald, supra  note 23.
30  Berman, supra  note 15 at 250.
31  Berman, supra  note 15 at 250.
32  Berman, supra  note 15 at 245.
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tional criminal tribunals.33 To help alleviate this problem, international 
criminal tribunals have been granted the formal power to compel the 
attendance and testimony of witnesses.34  
The  rules  governing  both  the  ICTY  and  the  ICTR  specifically  grant  
the tribunals the power to “issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, 
warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an 
investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial.”35 Similarly, 
the statute governing the ICC provides that “[i]n performing its func-
tions prior to trial or during the course of a trial,” the ICC has the power 
to “[r]equire the attendance and testimony of witnesses.”36 The power 
to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses is also derived 
from the “inherent powers” the international criminal tribunals enjoy 
as courts.37 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has held that the ICTY 
is vested with the authority to compel the attendance and testimony of 
“individuals who may be of assistance in the task of dispensing criminal 
justice.”38 No doubt the same can be said of the ICTR and the ICC.  Of 
course, as with most powers enjoyed by courts, the power international 
criminal tribunals have to compel witness testimony is not absolute.  
3. Testimonial Privileges
i.  Generally
Although it is generally understood “that justice is best served when 
all  relevant  evidence  is  placed  before  the  fact-­finder,”  there  are  eviden-
33  May & Wierda, supra  note 4 at xviii.
34  Kate MacKintosh, “Note for Humanitarian Organizations on Cooperation with 
International Tribunals” (2004) 86:853 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 131 at 132.
35  Rules  of  Procedure  and  Evidence, IT/32/Rev.36, rule 54, online:  United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm> [ICTY Rules] .<http://65.18.216.88/
ENGLISH/rules/070605/070605.pdf> [ICTR Rules].
36  ICC Statute, supra  note 9, art. 64(6)(b).
37  May & Wierda, supra  note 4 at 190.
38  Prosecutor  v.  Blaškić  (1997), Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of the 
Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997  
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia , Appeals Chamber) at 
paras. 47-48 online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty> [Blaškić  Interlocutory  
Appeal].
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tiary rules, like testimonial privileges, which have the effect of reduc-
ing the availability of relevant evidence.39 Testimonial privileges allow 
witnesses to refuse to testify in spite of the fact that they may possess 
relevant evidence. Such privileges are typically recognized by domestic 
courts in circumstances where it appears they will protect “interests and 
relationships  considered  sufficiently  important  to  society  to  warrant  the  
loss of otherwise competent testimony.”40 Testimonial privileges exist, 
for  example,  to  protect:  confidential  communications  between  lawyers  
and their clients, medical practitioners and their patients, and journalists 
and their sources.41 When a testimonial privilege is recognized, it signi-
fies  that  a  determination  has  been  made  that  the  purposes  served  by  the  
privilege  outweigh  the  fact-­finding  benefits  that  might  be  gained  if  the  
testimony in issue could be compelled.42 Of course, because testimonial 
privileges  can  impair  a  fact-­finder’s  ability  to  serve  justice,  they  tend  to  
be disfavoured and narrowly construed.43
A distinction should be drawn at this point between absolute and 
qualified   testimonial   privileges.  Absolute   testimonial   privileges   can-
not be overcome. They guarantee that the witness whose testimony is 
sought  cannot  be  compelled  to  testify.  Qualified  testimonial  privileges,  
on the other hand, can be overcome if it is demonstrated that the need 
for the testimony sought outweighs the interest that is being protected 
by the privilege.44  
ii.  Testimonial  Privileges  in  the  ICTY  and  the  ICTR
Like many domestic courts, international criminal tribunals grant testi-
monial privileges to certain individuals and groups.45 The rules govern-
ing the ICTY and the ICTR, for example, recognize that “all communi-
cations between lawyer and client” are privileged and consequently not 
39  Berman, supra  note 15 at 255.
40   Anthony  L.  Fargo,  “The  Journalist’s  Privilege  for  Non-­Confidential  Information  
in States with Shield Laws” (1999) 4 Comm. L. & Pol’y 325 at 361.
41  Berman, supra  note 15 at 256.
42  Berman, supra  note 15 at 256.
43  Berman, supra  note 15 at 255.
44  Buchanan, supra  note 14 at 623.
45  Steven Powles, “To Testify or Not to Testify – Privilege from Testimony at the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals: The Randal  Decision” (2003) 16 Leiden J. Int’l L. 511 at 513.
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subject to disclosure.46 In addition, through its jurisprudence, the ICTY 
has recognized a number of testimonial privileges. In Delalić,47 a Trial 
Chamber held that employees and functionaries of the ICTY should not 
be called upon to give evidence and refused to issue a subpoena to an 
ICTY interpreter.48 Similarly, on another motion, the Appeals Chamber 
held  that  a  Senior  Legal  Officer  and  the  former  President  of  the  ICTY  
could not be “subpoenaed to testify as witnesses on matters relating 
to  their  official  duties  or  functions.”49  In  the  Blaškić  Interlocutory  Ap-
peal,50  state  officials  acting  in   their  official  capacity  were  “effectively  
granted an absolute privilege from testimony.”51 On another motion, a 
Trial Chamber considered it necessary to obtain a waiver of immunity 
from the Secretary-General of the United Nations before it could require 
the testimony of a former Commander of United Nations Protection 
Force.52   In  Simić,53 a Trial Chamber determined that the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter ICRC) “enjoys an absolute 
privilege  to  withhold  its  confidential  information”  and  thus  has  the  pow-
er to prevent its employees from testifying to information they obtained 
in  the  course  of  their  official  duties.54 And, in the Randal case, which 
46  ICTY Rules, supra  note 35, rule 97; ICTR Rules, supra  note 35, rule 97.
47  Prosecutor  v.  Delalić  (1997), Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Motion Ex  
Parte  by the Defence of Zdravko Mucic Concerning the Issue of a Subpoena to an 
Interpreter (Internation Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber) 
online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty>.
48  Powles, supra  note 45.
49  Prosecutor  v.  Delalić  (1999), Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on Motion to Preserve 
and Provide Evidence (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Appeals Chamber) online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty>.
50  Supra  note 38.
51  Powles, supra  note 45.
52  Prosecutor  v.  Blaškić  (1999), Case No. IT-95-14 Decision of Trial Chamber I on 
Protective Measures for General Phillipe Morillon, Witness of the Trial Chamber 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I), online: 
United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty>.
53  Prosecutor  v.  Simić  (1999), Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on the Prosecution 
Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online: 
United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty>.
54   Gabor  Rona,  “The  ICRC  Privilege  Not  to  Testify:  Confidentiality  in  Action”  
(28 February 2004), online: < http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/
5WSD9Q?OpenDocument>.
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will be discussed in great detail in the next section, the Appeals Cham-
ber  granted  a  qualified  testimonial  privilege  to  war  correspondents.
Although the author has not researched the issue of whether testi-
monial privileges have been established by the ICTR, it is likely that the 
ICTR respects the testimonial privileges the ICTY has created.  This is 
certainly the case with testimonial privileges that have been established 
by the Appeals Chamber, as the Appeals Chamber is shared by the ICTY 
and the ICTR.   
iii.  Testimonial  Privileges  in  the  ICC
Like the rules governing the ICTY and the ICTR, the rules governing the 
ICC recognize that “communications made in the context of the profes-
sional relationship between a person and his or her legal counsel shall 
be regarded as privileged, and consequently not subject to disclosure.”55 
In addition, the ICC’s rules provide that “communications made in the 
context  of  a  class  of  professional  or  other  confidential  relationships  shall  
be regarded as privileged, and subsequently not subject to disclosure” 
when it is determined that:
Communications occurring within that class of relationship are made 
in  the  course  of  a  confidential  relationship  producing  a  reasonable  
expectation of privacy and non-disclosure;
Confidentiality   is   essential   to   the   nature   and   type   of   relationship  
between  the  person  and  the  confidant;;  and
Recognition of the privilege would further the objectives of the 
Statute and the Rules.56  
The ICC’s rules go on to provide that, in deciding whether commu-
nications  made  in  the  context  of  a  class  of  professional  or  other  confi-
dential relationships shall be regarded as privileged, the ICC must “give 
particular regard to recognizing as privileged those communications 
made in the context of the professional relationship between a person 
and his or her medical doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist or counselor, 
55  Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3, rule 73(1), online:  United 
Nations  <http://www.icc-­cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rules_of_Proc_and_
Evid_070704-­EN.pdf>  [ICC  Rules].
56  Ibid.  rule 73(2).
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[…] or between a person and a member of a religious clergy.”57 Finally, 
the rules governing the ICC recognize the absolute testimonial privilege 
the  ICTY  granted  to  the  ICRC  in  Simić.58 It is worth noting at this point 
that, like the rules which govern many domestic courts, the rules gov-
erning  the  ICC  only  contemplate  that  “communications  made  in  confi-
dence between persons holding certain relationships” shall be regarded 
as privileged.59
III. A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE FOR WAR CORRESPONDENTS 
In the Randal case, the ICTY was called upon to determine whether 
international criminal tribunals ought to grant a testimonial privilege to 
journalists  reporting  from  conflict  zones.  The  ICTY  was  the  first,  and  is  
to date the only, international criminal tribunal to consider this issue.
1. The Randal Case
i.  Facts
During   the  armed  conflict   in   the   former  Yugoslavia,   Jonathan  Randal  
(hereinafter Randal) worked as a war correspondent for the Washing-
ton Post. As part of the investigative work he did in Banja Luka, Ran-
dal interviewed one Radoslav Brdjanin (hereinafter Brdjanin). Because 
Randal did not speak Serbo-Croatian, and Brdjanin did not speak Eng-
lish, the interview was conducted with the interpretive assistance of a 
journalist who spoke both languages. Following the interview, Randal 
wrote an article which was published in the Washington Post.60 The 
article described Brdjanin as a “Bosnian Serb housing administrator” 
57  ICC Rules, supra  note 55, rule 73(3).
58  ICC Rules, supra  note 55, rule 73(4).
59  Carey Lening & Henry Cohen, Journalists’  Privilege  to  Withhold  Information  
in  Judicial  and  Other  Proceedings:  State  Shield  Statutes (Congressional Research 
Service, 2005) at 1, online: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL32806.pdf>.
60  Jonathan C. Randal, “Preserving the Fruits of Ethnic Cleansing; Bosnian Serbs, 
Expulsion Victims See Process as Beyond Reversal” Washington  Post  (11 February 
1993) A34.
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and “an avowed radical Serb nationalist”.61 It quoted Brdjanin as hav-
ing said: (1) “those unwilling to defend [Bosnian Serb territory] must 
be moved out” to “create an ethnically clean space”; (2) Muslims and 
Croats “should not be killed, but should be allowed to leave - and good 
riddance”; (3) Serb authorities are paying “too much attention to hu-
man rights”; and, (4) “[w]e are going to defend our frontiers at any cost 
[...] and wherever our army boots stand.”62 The article also claimed that 
Brdjanin was in the process of “preparing laws to expel non-Serbs from 
government housing to make room for 15,000 Serb refugees and for 
Serb combatants’ families.”63 
Years after the publication of Randal’s article, the ICTY charged 
Brdjanin with: genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and violations of the laws or customs 
of war.64 Brdjanin was subsequently brought before the ICTY to stand 
trial for the major international war crimes he was charged with. Dur-
ing a pre-trial conference, the Prosecution sought to introduce Randal’s 
article into evidence on the basis that it was relevant to establishing that 
Brdjanin possessed the requisite intent to commit the crimes he was 
charged with. The Defence objected on several grounds arguing, inter  
alia, that the statements the article attributed to Brdjanin were inaccu-
rate. The Defence asserted that, if the article were admitted, they would 
need an opportunity to cross-examine Randal. In response, the Prosecu-
tion requested that a subpoena be issued to compel Randal’s attendance 
and testimony.65 On January 29, 2002, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY 
(hereinafter Trial Chamber) complied with the Prosecution’s request 
and issued a subpoena (hereinafter Subpoena) to Randal.
On  May  8,  2002,  Randal  filed  a  written  motion  to  have  the  Subpoena  
set aside.66  He  argued  that,  as  a  war  reporter,  he  should  enjoy  a  qualified  
61  Ibid.  
62  Randal, supra  note 60.
63  Randal, supra  note 60.
64  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (2003), Case No. IT-99-36-T, Sixth Amended Indictment 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/icty>; Powles, supra  note 45 at 511.
65  Powles, supra  note 45 at 515.
66  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (8 May 2002), Case No. IT-99-36-T, Written Submissions 
on  Behalf  of  Jonathan  Randal  to  Set  Aside  Confidential  Subpoena  to  Give  Evidence  
(ICTY) [Randal’s Trial Chamber Submissions].
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privilege from being compelled to testify, “based on the long-term public 
interest  in  the  free  flow  of  information  from  conflict  zones.”67 According 
to Randal, if war reporters were routinely compelled to testify before 
international criminal tribunals, they would be perceived as “an inves-
tigative arm of a judicial system” and lose access to potential sources.68 
Randal also argued that the personal safety of war correspondents would 
be further threatened if they came to be perceived as potential witnesses 
for international criminal tribunals.69 The  Prosecution  filed  their  written  
response to Randal’s motion on May 9, 2002 and on May 10, 2002 the 
Trial Chamber heard the parties’ oral submissions.70 
ii.  Trial  Chamber  Decision
On June 7, 2002, the Trial Chamber rendered its decision to dismiss 
Randal’s motion and uphold the Subpoena.71 In reaching its decision, 
the Trial Chamber accepted Randal’s argument that journalists reporting 
from  conflict  zones  “play  a  vital  role  in  bringing  to  the  attention  of  the  
international  community  the  horrors  and  reality”  of  conflicts.72 It also 
acknowledged that “journalists should not be subpoenaed unnecessari-
ly” and that, when compelling the testimony of journalists, international 
criminal tribunals should ensure that they are not unduly hampering, 
obstructing or otherwise frustrating journalists’ vital news-gathering 
role.73  The  Trial  Chamber  even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  a  qualified  
privilege from testimony might be warranted to protect journalists from 
having   to   reveal  confidential   sources  or  unpublished  materials  before  
67   Eric  Lieberman  &  Fiona  Campbell,  “International  Tribunal  Recognizes  Qualified  
Privilege for War Correspondents” (2003) 20:4 Comm. Law. 10 at 10.
68  Ibid.
69  Lieberman & Campbell, supra  note 67.
70  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (9 May 2002), Case No. IT-99-36-T, Prosecution’s 
Response to Written Submissions on Behalf of Jonathan Randal to Set Aside 
Confidential  Subpoena  to  Give  Evidence  (International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  
Former Yugoslavia) online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty>.
71  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (7 June 2002), Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion 
to  Set  Aside  Confidential  Subpoena  to  Give  Evidence  (International  Criminal  
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II) at Disposition online: United 
Nations <http://www.un.org/icty> [Randal Trial Chamber Decision].
72  Ibid.  at 25.
73  Randal Trial Chamber Decision, supra  note 71 at para. 27.
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international criminal tribunals.74 In the end, however, the Trial Cham-
ber held that, when the testimony sought from a journalist relates only 
to  identified  sources  and  published  materials,  its  compellability  “poses  
only a minimal threat to the news gathering and news reporting func-
tions” of journalists.75 It also held that a published article is like a public 
statement “and that when such a statement is entered in evidence in a 
criminal trial and its credibility [is] challenged, the author, like anyone 
else who makes a claim in public, must expect to be called to defend its 
accuracy.”76 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber concluded that Randal had 
“no right to pretend” that he could not be questioned on the article he 
published simply because he was a journalist.77  
It is worth noting that, in upholding the validity of the Subpoena, 
the  Trial  Chamber  determined  that  it  was  sufficient  that  the  testimony  
sought from Randal was “pertinent” to the Prosecution’s case against 
Brdjanin.78 It also considered the fact that there was “absolutely no indi-
cation” that Randal, a retired journalist residing in Paris and the United 
States, “could possibly be exposed to […] harm or risk” if forced to 
testify.79     
Randal  obtained  certification  to  appeal  the  Trial  Chamber’s  decision  
on June 19, 2002.80  On  June  26,  2002,  he  filed  written  submissions  in  
support of his appeal.81  The  Prosecution  filed  their  response  to  Randal’s  
74  Randal Trial Chamber Decision, supra  note 71 at paras. 29 and 31.
75  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 8. 
76  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 8.
77  Randal Trial Chamber Decision, supra  note 71 at para. 32.
78  Randal Trial Chamber Decision, supra  note 71 at para. 32.
79  Randal Trial Chamber Decision, supra  note 71 at para. 28(B).
80  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (19 June 2002), Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision to Grant 
Certification  to  Appeal  the  Trial  Chamber’s  “Decision  on  Motion  to  Set  Aside  
Confidential  Subpoena  to  Give  Evidence”  (International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  
Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II) online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/
icty>.
81  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (4 July 2002), Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, Written 
Submissions in Support of Motion to Appeal Trial Chamber’s Decision on Motion 
on  Behalf  of  Jonathan  Randal  to  Set  Aside  Confidential  Subpoena  to  Give  Evidence  
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber) 
online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty> [Randal’s Appeals Chamber 
Submissions].
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written submissions on July 15, 2002.82  Randal replied to the same on 
August 6, 2002.83 In the meantime, thirty-four media companies and as-
sociations of journalists obtained permission from the Appeals Chamber 
of  the  ICTY  (hereinafter  Appeals  Chamber)  to  file  an  amici  curiae  brief  
in support of Randal’s appeal.84  The  same  was  filed  on  August  16,  2002  
and on October 3, 2002 the Appeals Chamber heard the parties’ oral 
submissions.85 
iii.  Randal’s  Position
In advancing his position that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to recog-
nize  a  qualified  privilege  for  journalists,  Randal  argued  that  such  a  privi-
lege is necessary “to safeguard the ability of journalists to investigate 
and  report  effectively”  from  conflict  zones.86 He noted that, “[w]ithout a 
qualified  privilege,  journalists  may  be  put  at  risk  personally,  may  expose  
their sources to risk, and may be denied access to important informa-
tion and sources in the future.”87 In Randal’s view, a failure on the part 
of  international  criminal  tribunals  to  recognize  a  qualified  privilege  for  
journalists would result in “less journalistic exposure of international 
crimes” and a consequential “hindering of the very process of interna-
tional justice that international criminal tribunals […] are designed to 
82  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (15 July 2002), Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, Prosecution’s 
Response to Written Submissions in Support of Motion to Appeal Trial Chamber’s 
Decision  on  Motion  on  Behalf  of  Jonathan  Randal  to  Set  Aside  Confidential  
Subpoena to Give Evidence Filed 4 July 2002 (ICTY) [Prosecution’s Appeals 
Chamber Submissions].
83  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (6 August 2002), Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, Appellant’s 
Reply to Prosecution’s Response to Written Submissions in Support of Motion to 
Appeal Trial Chamber’s Decision on Motion on Behalf of Jonathan Randal to Set 
Aside  Confidential  Subpoena  to  Give  Evidence  Filed  4  July  2002  (International  
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) online: United Nations <http://www.
un.org/icty>.
84  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 7.
85  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (6 August 2002), Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, Brief Amici  
Curaie  on Behalf of Various Media Entities and in Support of Jonathan Randal’s 
Appeal  of  Trial  Chamber’s  Decision  on  Motion  to  Set  Aside  Confidential  Subpoena  
to Give Evidence (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslaiva) online: 
United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty> [Amici  Curaie’s Submissions].
86  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 11.
87  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 11.
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serve.”88 Contrary to the opinion of the Trial Chamber, Randal argued 
that,  to  be  effective,  a  qualified  privilege  for  journalists  would  have  to  
protect  identified  sources  and  published  materials  as  well  as  confidential  
sources and unpublished materials.89   
In his written submissions, Randal drew the Appeal Chambers’ at-
tention to the fact that the ICTY had relied upon policy reasons to recog-
nize testimonial privileges for certain other classes of individuals.90 He 
submitted  that  comparable  policy  reasons  justified  the  recognition  of  a  
qualified  privilege  from  testimony  for  journalists.91 Randal also pointed 
to   international   legal  materials  which  seemed  to  support   the  qualified  
privilege he sought.92 He noted, for example, that Additional Protocol 
I to the Geneva Conventions93 recognizes the great dangers journalists 
are  exposed  to  and  acknowledges  their  special  status  in  conflict  zones.94 
He also noted that, in Goodwin,95 the European Court of Human Rights 
recognized journalists’ unique role and the importance of protecting 
journalistic sources.96 Finally, Randal claimed that cases from the Unit-
ed States and the United Kingdom, and the internal guidelines of the 
United States Department of Justice, supported the creation of a quali-
fied  privilege  for  journalists.97
88  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 11.
89  Randal’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 81 at para. 41.
90  Randal’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 81 at para. 20.
91  Randal’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 81 at para. 20.
92  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 13.
93  See Article 79 of Protocol  Additional  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  12  August  
1949,  and  Relating  to  the  Protection  of  Victims  of  International  Armed  Conflicts  
(Protocol  I),  8  June  1977,  1125  U.N.T.S.  3  which  sets  out  specific  “Measures  of  
protection for journalists”.
94  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 13.
95  See Goodwin  v.  United  Kingdom, (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123 [Goodwin], wherein 
it was successfully argued (in a non-criminal case) that an order requiring a 
trainee journalist to reveal the identity of a source violated his right to freedom 
of expression. At para. 39 in Goodwin,  the European Court of Human Rights 
recognized journalists’ “vital public-watchdog role” and “the importance of the 
protection of journalistic sources for press freedom.” It also noted (at para. 39) that 
compelling journalists to disclose their sources could hinder “the ability of the press 
to provide accurate and reliable information.”  
96  Randal’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 81 at para. 46.
97  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 14.
COMPELLING WAR CORRESPONDENTS TO TESTIFY . . . 149 
Randal submitted that, in determining whether to compel the testi-
mony  of  a  journalist,  it  is  insufficient  for  an  international  criminal  tri-
bunal   to  find,   as   the  Trial  Chamber   did,   that   the   sought   testimony   is  
“pertinent” to the case.98 Instead, Randal proposed that a journalist’s 
testimony should only be compelled if it is shown that the journalist 
will provide admissible evidence that: (1) is “of crucial importance” 
to the “determination of a defendant’s guilt or innocence”; (2) “cannot 
be obtained by any other means or from any other witness”; (3) will 
not   require   the   journalist   to   breach   any   obligation   of   confidence;;   (4)  
will not put the journalist “or his family or sources in any reasonably 
apprehended personal danger”; and, (5) will not result in the creation 
“a precedent which would unnecessarily jeopardize the effectiveness or 
safety of other journalists.”99   
iv.  The  Position  of  the  Amici  Curiae
A number of the arguments made by Randal were reiterated by the Ami-
ci Curiae. They argued that forcing journalists to testify against their 
sources would make potential sources “less likely to come forward, less 
likely to speak freely, and more likely to fear that journalists are acting 
as possible agents of their future prosecutor.”100 They also claimed that, 
if compelled to testify, journalists would be robbed “of their status as 
observers” and transformed “into participants, undermining their cred-
ibility and independence and thus their ability to gather information.”101 
Like Randal, the Amici Curaie suggested that this would restrict the 
important  benefits  international  criminal  tribunals  and  the  public  stand  
to gain from the work of journalists.102
Among  other  documents,  the  Amici  Curaie  relied  upon  an  affidavit  
sworn by the late Elizabeth Neuffer (hereinafter Neuffer),103 an award-
winning  reporter  who  covered  a  number  of  armed  conflicts  for  The  Bos-
ton Globe.104 Neuffer suggested that many journalists, herself included, 
98  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 15.
99  Randal’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 81 at para. 18.
100  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 18.
101  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 18.
102  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 18.
103  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at Exhibit A.
104  “Veteran Globe Reporter Elizabeth Neuffer Killed in Car Accident in Iraq” (9 
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had helped advance the work of international criminal tribunals by in-
formally cooperating with the same.105 She noted that, while reporting 
from the former Yugoslavia, she came to know many ICTY investiga-
tors and prosecutors and that, on several occasions, she passed informa-
tion relating to war crimes along to them.106 By way of example, Neuffer 
mentioned that it was her and her translator who led those investigat-
ing the Srebrenica genocide to the “trail of skeletons” they discovered 
on Mt. Kamenica.107 Neuffer also noted that journalists who reported 
from Rwanda and Zaire in 1997 often found themselves in possession 
of information that ICTR investigators and prosecutors were incapable 
of retrieving.108 According to Neuffer, some of those journalists will-
ingly made the important information they gathered available to ICTR 
staff.109    
After drawing attention to the fact that journalists try to cooperate 
with international criminal tribunals when they can,110 Neuffer suggest-
ed that it is often the case that journalists are not in a position to cooper-
ate with such tribunals, particularly when they have obtained informa-
tion   from   confidential   sources.111 She was strongly against the ICTY 
establishing a precedent that would permit journalists to be forced to 
testify,  on  a  routine  basis,  about  confidential  or  non-­confidential  sourc-
es.112 In Neuffer’s opinion, if war reporters were routinely compelled to 
testify before international criminal tribunals, their independence would 
be compromised and their safety further jeopardized.113 Implicit in her 
comments was a warning to the ICTY and other international criminal 
tribunals that they stand to lose the informal cooperation offered to them 
May 2003) The  Boston  Globe,  online:  The Boston Globe <http://www.boston.com/
news/daily/09/neuffer.htm>. 
105  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at para. 8 of Exhibit A.
106  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at paras. 5 and 6 of Exhibit A.
107  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at para. 7 of Exhibit A.
108  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at para. 9 of Exhibit A.
109  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at para. 9 of Exhibit A.
110  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at para. 10 of Exhibit A.
111  Richard Byrne, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” The  Boston  Pheonix  (26 September 
- 3 October 2002),  online: The Boston Phoenix <www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/
news_features/  top/features/documents/02452089.htm>.
112  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at paras. 17 and 20 of Exhibit A.
113  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at para. 19 of Exhibit A.
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by war correspondents if they fail to grant war correspondents adequate 
protections from having to testify.114  
The test the Amici Curaie proposed for determining whether a sub-
poena can be issued to a journalist was simpler and less burdensome 
than that proposed by Randal.115 They took the position that a subpoena 
should only be issued to compel the testimony of a journalist when: 
(1) the testimony is “absolutely essential to the case” and (2) the infor-
mation sought “cannot be obtained by any other means.”116 The Amici 
Curaie noted that for testimony to be “essential” it would have to be 
critical to the determination a defendant’s guilt or innocence.117   
v.  The  Prosecution’s  Position
Not surprisingly, the Prosecution took the position that the Trial Cham-
ber  was  correct  in  refusing  to  create  a  qualified  privilege  which  would  
protect Randal from having to testify. The Prosecution noted that the 
testimony  sought  from  Randal  only  concerned  non-­confidential   infor-
mation.118  They  argued  that,  whatever  benefits  might  be  gained  from  a  
privilege  protecting  testimony  concerning  confidential  sources  and  ma-
terials,  “no  such  benefits  accrue  from  a  privilege  protecting  testimony  
concerning  published  materials  and  openly  identified  sources.”119 Con-
trary to the views expressed by Randal and the Amici Curaie, the Pros-
ecution suggested that it is the publication of information obtained by 
journalists – rather than the possibility that journalists might be called 
upon to testify about what they have published – which threatens their 
future news-gathering ability.120 The Prosecution also maintained that, 
if journalists were granted the testimonial privilege sought by Randal, 
the ICTY’s ability to reach accurate judgments would be undermined 
because essential evidence would be unavailable to it.121    
114  Byrne, supra  note 111.
115  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 20.
116  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at para. 43.
117  Amici  Curaie’s Submissions, supra  note 85 at para. 44.
118  Prosecution’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 82 at para. 6.
119  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 23.
120  Prosecution’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 82 at para. 8.
121  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 24.
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The Prosecution distinguished the testimonial privileges the ICTY 
extended   to  other  classes  of  persons   from  the  qualified  privilege  pro-
posed by Randal and the Amici Curaie.122 They also noted that a privi-
lege  protecting   journalists   from  having   to   testify  about  non-­confiden-
tial sources and materials “would be unprecedented in international 
or national legal systems.”123  Specifically,   the  Prosecution  argued  that  
the decision in Goodwin, and the cases from the United States and the 
United Kingdom that were relied upon by Randal, were either largely, or 
exclusively,  concerned  with  the  protection  of  confidential  sources  and  
materials.124  
The Prosecution submitted that the tests proposed by Randal and 
the Amici Curaie would unduly hinder the ability of international crimi-
nal tribunals to achieve justice by restricting the relevant and probative 
evidence available to them and potentially interfering with the fair trial 
rights of accused persons.125 In the opinion of the Prosecution, the Trial 
Chamber adopted the correct approach to determining the validity of the 
Subpoena when it balanced the legitimate interests of journalists against 
the interests of the international community, the victims of crime and 
accused persons.126   
vi.  Appeals  Chamber  Decision
The Appeals Chamber began its decision by noting that, while the par-
ties and the Amici Curaie had framed the issue before it as one concern-
ing journalists, the issue was really one concerning war correspondents, 
a much narrower group.127 According to the Appeals Chamber, at stake 
was the type of work done, and the risks faced by, individuals reporting 
from  conflict  zones.128 Thus, the Appeals Chamber held that its decision 
would  only  concern  “war  correspondents,”  who  it  defined  as  “individu-
122  Prosecution’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 85 at paras. 28-33.
123  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 25.
124  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 26.
125  Prosecution’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 85 at para. 26.
126  Prosecution’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 85 at para. 58.
127  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 29.
128  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 29.
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als who, for any period of time, report (or investigate for the purpose of 
reporting)  from  a  conflict  zone  on  issues  relating  to  the  conflict.”129
The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that it was dealing with a nov-
el issue, as there was no decided case law on the question of whether 
a war correspondent can be compelled to testify before a war crimes 
tribunal.130 It noted that the war correspondents who had previously 
testified  at  the  ICTY  had  done  so  on  a  voluntary  basis.131 The Appeals 
Chamber tackled the issue before it by posing itself the following three 
questions: 
(1) Is there a public interest in the work of war correspondents?  
(2) If yes, would compelling war correspondents to testify before 
a tribunal adversely affect their ability to carry out their work?  
(3) If yes, what test is appropriate to balance the public interest in 
accommodating the work of war correspondents with the public 
interest in having all relevant evidence available to the court and, 
where it is implicated, the right of the defendant to challenge the 
evidence against him?132  
a.  Public  Interest  in  the  Work  of  War  Correspondents
Without hesitation, the Appeals Chamber determined that there is a pub-
lic interest in the work of war correspondents. It recognized the impor-
tant role war correspondents play in ensuring that the public receives 
vital   information   from   conflict   zones.133 It also recognized that infor-
mation gathered by war correspondents might assist those responsible 
for preventing or punishing major international crimes.134 The Appeals 
Chamber went on to hold that the fact that there is a public interest in the 
work of war correspondents is evidenced in international human rights 
instruments, which provide that everyone has the right to freedom of ex-
pression.135 It stated that, in addition to granting journalists the right to 
129  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 29.
130  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 30.
131  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 30.
132  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 34.
133  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 38.
134  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 36.
135  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 37.
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freely communicate information, the right to freedom of expression “in-
corporates a right of members of the public to receive information.”136
b.  Consequences  of  Compelling  War  Correspondents  to  Testify        
After considering the arguments advanced by Randal and the Amici 
Curaie, the Appeals Chamber concluded that it was “impossible to deter-
mine with certainty” whether, and to what extent, compelling war corre-
spondents to testify before international criminal tribunals would “ham-
per their ability to work.”137 The Appeals Chamber did acknowledge, 
however, that, if war correspondents were routinely compelled to testify 
before international criminal tribunals, their ability to obtain important 
information  and  to  provide  the  same  to  the  public  might  be  significantly  
impacted.138 This was said to be true whether the testimony sought from 
war  correspondents  related  to  confidential  or  non-­confidential  sources  
and materials.139 According to the Appeals Chamber, “[w]hat really mat-
ters is the perception that war correspondents can be forced to become 
witnesses against their interviewees.”140 The Appeals Chamber accepted 
that, if perceived as potential witnesses, war correspondents might lose 
their  ability  to  gather  significant  information  and  become  targets,  rather  
than observers, of those who commit major international crimes.141
c.  The  Appropriate  Test
The Appeals Chamber held that an international criminal tribunal must 
employ a balancing exercise when deciding whether to compel the tes-
timony of a war correspondent.142  Specifically,  it  held  that  the  interest  
of justice in having all relevant evidence put before the international 
criminal tribunal must be balanced with the public interest in the work 
of war correspondents.143 Although the Appeals Chamber agreed with 
136  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 37.
137  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 40.
138  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 44.
139  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 42.
140  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 43.
141  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 43.
142  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 46.
143  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 46.
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Randal and the Amici Curaie that the test of “pertinence” applied by the 
Trial Chamber did not adequately protect the public interest in the work 
of war correspondents, it thought that the alternative tests proposed by 
Randal and the Amici Curaie were too stringent.144 Accordingly, the Ap-
peals Chamber came up with its own test. It held that a subpoena can 
only be issued to a war correspondent if the party seeking the subpoena 
demonstrates that the testimony sought from the war correspondent: (1) 
“is of direct and important value in determining a core issue in the case” 
and (2) “cannot reasonably be obtained elsewhere.”145
d.  Validity  of  Subpoena  Issued  to  Randal
In light of the test it established for determining whether a war corre-
spondent can be compelled to testify before an international criminal tri-
bunal, the Appeals Chamber reversed the decision of the Trial Chamber 
and set the subpoena aside.146 It refused, however, to determine whether, 
on the facts of the case, Randal could be compelled to testify before the 
ICTY.147 The Appeals Chamber held that this determination should be 
left to a trial chamber and that, if the Prosecution still wished to compel 
Randal’s testimony, they would have to submit a new application for a 
subpoena.148
Although it did not resolve the issue of whether Randal himself 
could be compelled by the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber did make a 
number of observations that related to this issue. It noted, for example, 
that, even if a trial chamber were to decide that Randal could not be 
compelled to testify, the article he published might still be admitted into 
evidence.149 The Appeals Chamber suggested that admitting the article 
into evidence, without compelling Randal’s testimony, would not nec-
essarily prejudice Brdjanin as: (1) the Defence would still be able to 
question its accuracy and (2) the weight accorded to it by a trial chamber 
would take Randal’s unavailability into account.150 The Appeals Cham-
144  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 47.
145  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 50.
146  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at Disposition.
147  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 51.
148  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at paras. 51and 54-55.
149  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 52.
150  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 53.
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ber also noted that, irrespective of the evidentiary value of the article, a 
trial chamber determining whether to issue a subpoena to Randal would 
have to consider whether his testimony, in and of itself, would be of 
direct and important value to determining a core issue in the case.151 
The Appeals Chamber expressed the view that, in light of the fact that 
Randal did not speak Brdjanin’s language (and thus that he relied on 
another  journalist  for  interpretation),  it  was  “difficult  to  imagine”  how  
his testimony could reach that threshold.152        
vii.  Second  Request  for  a  Subpoena  Compelling  Randal’s  Testimony
In light of the observations offered by the Appeals Chamber in the Ran-
dal case, it is not surprising that, when the Prosecution made its second 
request for a subpoena to compel Randal’s testimony, the Trial Chamber: 
(1) refused the request and (2) admitted Randal’s article into evidence 
“without prejudice to the weight to be ascribed to it.”153 In reaching its 
decision,  the  Trial  Chamber  admitted  that  it  found  it  difficult  to  depart  
from the Appeals Chamber’s reasoning.154  
2. Critique of the Randal Case
Much credit ought to be given to the Appeals Chamber for its recog-
nition of the need for international criminal tribunals to give heed to 
the public’s interest in the work of war correspondents when exercising 
their power to compel witness testimony. The Randal case, however, 
is   not  without   its  flaws.  The  debate   it   sparked  among   journalists,   for  
example,  suggests  that  the  qualified  testimonial  privilege  it  created  may  
unnecessarily protect war correspondents from having to testify about 
sources  they  have  identified  and  materials  they  have  published.  In  addi-
tion, there is a concern that the privilege the Randal case granted to war 
correspondents  may:  (1)  open  the  floodgates  to  new  testimonial  privi-
151  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 54.
152  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 54.
153  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (30 June 2003), Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on 
Prosecution’s Second Request for a Subpoena of Jonathan Randal (International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II) at Disposition 
online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty> [Randal Trial Chamber Decision 2].
154  Ibid.  at para. 29.
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lege claims and (2) allow groups other than journalists reporting from 
conflict  zones  to  claim  access  to  it.  It  is  also  disconcerting  that  the  Ran-
dal case overlooked the option of granting witness protective measures, 
rather  than  a  qualified  testimonial  privilege,  to  war  correspondents.  Fi-
nally, by contemplating that the work product of a war correspondent 
can be admitted into evidence, notwithstanding the fact that its creator 
cannot be compelled to testify, the Randal case did not adequately con-
sider the fair trial rights of an accused. 
i.  Disagreement  About  Whether  War  Correspondents  Require  (or  
Deserve)  a  Qualified  Testimonial  Privilege  
The  significant  public  attention  the  Randal  case  received  sparked  a  de-
bate among journalists regarding what their responsibilities are in the 
prosecution of perpetrators of major international crimes.155 Although 
Randal had the support of a coalition of media companies and press 
freedom groups, there were a number of respected journalists who 
expressed their disagreement with the arguments he advanced in the 
ICTY.156  
For example, Randal was harshly criticized by Ed Vulliamy (herein-
after Vulliamy), a prize-winning war correspondent for the Guardian.157 
Like  Randal,  Vulliamy  covered   the  conflict   in   the  former  Yugoslavia.  
Unlike Randal, however, Vulliamy elected to testify before the ICTY – 
in  1997,  he  voluntarily  gave  evidence  in  the  case  of  Milan  Kovačević.158 
Vulliamy’s experience testifying before the ICTY was by no means 
enjoyable.159  Despite this, he expressed the view that the arguments 
advanced by Randal were “dangerously wrong.”160 Vulliamy suggested 
that, by seeking to ensure that the testimony of journalists was unavail-
able to international criminal tribunals, Randal was threatening the ef-
155  Lieberman & Campbell, supra  note 67.
156  Lieberman & Campbell, supra  note 67.
157  Lieberman & Campbell, supra  note 67 at 12.
158  Ed Vulliamy, “An Obligation to Tell the Truth” The  Observer  (19 May 
2002),  online:  The Observer <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/milosevic/
story/0,10639,718225,00.html>.
159  See Ed Vulliamy, “‘Neutrality’ and the Absence of Reckoning: A Journalist’s 
Account” (1999) 52:2 J. Int’l Affairs 603 at 617-618. 
160  Vulliamy, supra  note 158.
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ficacy  of   such   tribunals.161 In Vulliamy’s opinion, war reporters have 
a professional, moral and legal obligation “to stand by their stories on 
oath” before international criminal tribunals.162 He suggested that jour-
nalists, who often possess valuable information, should not be able to 
“perch loftily above the due process of law.”163 Regarding Randal’s 
suggestion that compelling journalists to testify before international 
criminal tribunals would turn them into targets, Vulliamy simply stated 
that “[g]ood reporters put themselves in danger, whether they testify or 
not.”164
While Randal’s appeal was pending, Jacky Rowland, a journalist 
who  covered   the  conflict   in   the   former  Yugoslavia   for   the  BBC,  vol-
untarily  testified  before  the  ICTY  in  the  case  of  Slobodan  Milošević.165 
Rowland said that she felt she had a duty to testify and that she did not 
“really buy the argument” that testifying before international criminal 
tribunals “makes life more dangerous for journalists”.166 Martin Bell, 
another   journalist  who   covered   the   conflict   in   the   former  Yugoslavia  
for  the  BBC,  and  who  voluntarily  testified  before  the  ICTY,167 took the 
position that a journalist’s “duties as a citizen,”which include the duty 
to testify before international criminal tribunals when one witnesses a 
crime or the aftermath of a crime, come before his or her “duties as a 
journalist.”168  
Lindsey  Hilsum,  a  freelance  journalist  who  covered  the  conflict  in  
Rwanda, made similar comments when she described why she agreed to 
testify before the ICTR in the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu.169 According 
161  Vulliamy, supra  note 158.
162  Vulliamy, supra  note 158.
163  Vulliamy, supra  note 158.
164  Vulliamy, supra  note 158.
165  Lieberman & Campbell, supra  note 67 at 12.
166  Matt Wells, “BBC Reporter to Testify at Hague War Crimes Tribunal: 
Correspondent Faces Questions About Deaths in Kosovo Prison” Guardian  
(20 August 2002),  online:  The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/yugo/
article/0,2763,777381,00.html>. 
167   Martin  Bell  testified  in  the  case  of  Tihomir  Blaškić.
168  Wells, supra  note 166.
169  See Lindsey Hilsum, “Deciding to Testify About Rwanda” (2003) 57 Nieman  
Reports  78. 
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to Hilsum, “[r]eporting matters, but sometimes justice matters more.”170 
Hilsum  said  that  the  horror  she  witnessed  in  Rwanda  was  sufficient  to  
make the rules protecting journalists from having to testify seem in-
applicable.171 Although Hilsum acknowledged that, as a journalist, she 
could have argued against testifying, she said that, as a human being, 
she could not.172 Hilsum did not believe that by testifying before the 
ICTR she put herself and other journalists in danger.173 In her opinion, 
“[a] war correspondent’s job is more dangerous than it used to be be-
cause 24-hour satellite television has made combatants aware of the me-
dia,”  not  because  a  handful  of  war  correspondents  have  testified  before  
international criminal tribunals.174
It is important to note that, like the testimony sought from Randal, 
the testimony sought from the above-noted war correspondents related 
only to information that was already in the public domain. It is quite pos-
sible that the views expressed by Vulliamy, Rowland, Bell and Hilsum 
would  have  been  different  had  they  been  called  upon  to  reveal  confiden-
tial sources or unpublished materials before an international criminal 
tribunal.  In  any  event,  at  least  with  respect  to  identified  sources  and  pub-
lished materials, their comments call into question whether the work of 
war  correspondents  will  be  significantly  hampered  if  their  testimony  is  
too easily compelled by international criminal tribunals. Consequently, 
one  must  question  whether  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  qualified  privilege  
to protect war correspondents from having to testify before international 
criminal  tribunals  about  non-­confidential  sources  and  materials.
ii.  Opening  the  Floodgates  to  Other  Testimonial  Privilege  Claims  
Some  have   expressed   concern   that   the   qualified   testimonial   privilege  
created for war correspondents in the Randal case might “spur a rash 
of claims for the creation of similar privileges” for other individuals 
who  do   important  work   in   conflict   zones.175 This concern is valid. It 
170  Ibid.  at 78.
171  Hilsum, supra  note 169 at 78.
172  Hilsum, supra  note 169 at 79.
173  Hilsum, supra  note 169 at 78.
174  Hilsum, supra  note 169 at 78-79.
175  Megan A. Fairlie, “Evidentiary Privilege of Journalists Reporting in Areas of 
Armed  Conflict  –  Evidence  in  War  Crimes  Trials  –  Rule-­Making  Process  of  ICTY”  
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has already been suggested, for example, that members of humanitarian 
organizations  should,  at  a  minimum,  be  able  to  claim  the  qualified  testi-
monial privilege that has been afforded to war correspondents.176  
Like war correspondents, humanitarian organizations “are in a privi-
leged position to observe what happens in war.”177 As a consequence, 
they are often contacted by those tasked with bringing perpetrators of 
major international crimes to justice to see what information they can 
offer.178 Notwithstanding the fact that many humanitarian organizations 
support the idea of having perpetrators of major international crimes 
tried before international criminal tribunals, they are often reluctant to 
have their members testify in international criminal proceedings.179 This 
is because they worry about compromising their perceived neutrality, 
forfeiting their access to victims, and putting the safety of their staff at 
risk.180 As such, it will be surprising if humanitarian organizations do 
not jump at the chance to rely upon the Randal case to claim that, like 
war correspondents, their members deserve a privilege from testifying 
before international criminal tribunals. 
In light of the line of reasoning adopted by the Appeals Chamber in 
the Randal case, it is not unlikely that such claims would be successful. 
It is certainly arguable that there is at least as great a public interest in 
the work of humanitarian organizations, which provide food, shelter and 
medical  treatment  to  victims  of  armed  conflicts,  as  there  is  in  the  work  
of war correspondents.181 In addition, it is conceivable that routinely 
compelling members of such organizations to testify before internation-
al criminal tribunals would have the same adverse affects on their abil-
ity to carry out their work as those the Appeals Chamber sought to avoid 
by  creating  a  qualified  testimonial  privilege  for  war  correspondents.182  
In   addition   to   the   concern   that   the   qualified   testimonial   privilege  
created  for  war  correspondents  in  the  Randal  case  might  open  the  flood-
gates to new testimonial privilege claims, there is a concern that the 
(2004) 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 805 at 809.
176  MacKintosh, supra  note 34 at 137.
177  MacKintosh, supra  note 34 at 131.
178  MacKintosh, supra  note 34 at 131.
179  MacKintosh, supra  note 34 at 131.
180  MacKintosh, supra  note 34 at 131.
181  MacKintosh, supra  note 34 at 137.
182  MacKintosh, supra  note 34 at 137.
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existing privilege could be relied upon by groups other than journalists 
reporting  from  conflict  zones.  It  has  been  suggested,  for  example,  that  
the privilege might protect individuals employed by human rights moni-
tors like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who, like war 
correspondents,  are  sent  into  conflict  zones  to  gather  information  which  
they subsequently report on.183 It is certainly arguable that because the 
definition  of  ‘war  correspondents’  articulated  by  the  Appeals  Chamber  
in the Randal case is not tied to the terms ‘journalist’, ‘media’ or the 
‘press’, it may be broad enough to open the door “for a substantial class 
of individuals to claim access to the privilege.”184
The potential the Randal case has to (1) trigger new testimonial priv-
ilege claims and (2) cause unforeseen individuals to claim access to the 
privilege that has been created for war correspondents is problematic. 
The interlocutory proceedings necessary to deal with the potential wave 
of   testimonial  privilege  claims  would  undoubtedly  affect   the  efficacy  
of international criminal tribunals.185 If international criminal tribunals 
find  themselves  “occupied  by  privilege-­based  litigation,”  rather  than  the  
adjudication of cases brought against alleged war criminals, they will 
be in danger of losing much of the support they have gained from the 
international community.186 In addition, and perhaps more importantly, 
if international criminal tribunals make a habit of granting testimonial 
privileges to all those individuals who can claim to be in a situation 
analogous to that of war correspondents, they will seriously impair their 
fact-­finding  function  and  their  ability  to  serve  the  purposes  for  which  
they were created. 
iii.  An  Option  Overlooked  in  the  Randal  Case
Existing international criminal tribunals have a range of measures at 
their disposal which they can use to ensure that a witness’ identity is not 
183  Fairlie, supra  note 175, at 809; Francoise J. Hampson, “The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Reluctant Witness” (1998) 47 
I.C.L.Q. 50 at 65.
184  Fairlie, supra  note 175, at 809; Megan A. Fairlie, “Rulemaking from the Bench: 
A Place for Minimalism at the ICTY” (2004) 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 257 at 283.
185  Fairlie, supra  note 175, at 809.
186  Fairlie, supra  note 175, at 809.
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disclosed to the public.187 Among other things, they can: (1) allow wit-
nesses to use a pseudonym; (2) delete witnesses’ names or identifying 
information from public records; (3) hold closed session hearings; and, 
(4) use voice or image-altering devices on the television recordings of 
their proceedings.188 Although these measures are typically employed 
“to ensure the safety of victim-witnesses,” there is nothing preventing 
them from being used to protect “other reluctant witnesses.”189 Notwith-
standing that the written submissions of both Randal and the Prosecution 
discussed the ICTY’s ability to grant protective measures to war corre-
spondents, no mention was made of this option in the Randal case.190    
That the Appeals Chamber overlooked the ICTY’s ability to employ 
protective  measures   to  keep   the   identity  of  war  correspondents  confi-
dential is problematic. If, as the Appeals Chamber suggested, what re-
ally matters is avoiding the perception that war correspondents can be 
forced to become witnesses against their interviewees, it seems that it 
might   be   sufficient   to   grant   protective  measures,   rather   than   a   quali-
fied  testimonial  privilege,  to  war  correspondents.191 It is certainly argu-
able that protective measures could be used to ensure that the public re-
mained  unaware  of  the  fact  that  a  war  correspondent  testified  before  an  
international criminal tribunal. A war correspondent could, for example, 
be   issued   a   confidential   subpoena   and  offered   the   “particularly   strin-
gent protective measures”192 that were offered to reluctant witnesses in 
Blaškić.193 Those measures included the use of in camera testimony, a 
redaction of the witnesses’ names (and any information that might iden-
187  May & Weirda, supra  note 4 at 180.
188  May & Weirda, supra  note 4 at 181; ICTY Rules, supra  note 35, rule 75; ICTR 
Rules, supra  note 35, rule 75; ICC Statute, supra  note 9, art. 68.
189  Berman, supra  note 15 at 251.
190  Randal’s Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 81 at para. 44; Prosecution’s 
Appeals Chamber Submissions, supra  note 82 at para. 11.
191  Randal Case, supra  note 2 at para. 43.
192  May & Wierda, supra  note 4 at 195.
193  Prosecutor  v.    Blaškić  (10 July 1997), Case No. IT-95-14, Decision of Trial 
Chamber I on the Prosecutor’s Request of 5 and 11 July 1997 for Protection of 
Witnesses (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber 
I) online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty>.
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tify them) from all public documents and a prohibition against divulging 
any information about the witnesses and their testimony.194
The fact that the Appeals Chamber overlooked the option of grant-
ing protective measures to war correspondents does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that war correspondents should never enjoy a privilege 
from testifying before international criminal tribunals. It does, however, 
suggest that the test proposed by the Appeals Chamber needs to be re-
worked. In determining whether to compel the testimony of a war cor-
respondent, an international criminal tribunal should at least consider 
whether  the  employment  of  protective  measures  might  be  sufficient  to  
avoid  any  adverse  consequences   that  could  flow  from  compelling   the  
war correspondent’s testimony. 
iv.  Inadequate  Attention  Paid  to  the  Rights  of  the  Accused
In   the  Randal  case,   the  Appeals  Chamber  sought   to  create  a  qualified  
testimonial privilege for war correspondents that would fairly balance 
the interest of justice in having all relevant evidence put before a court 
and the public interest in the work of war correspondents. Unfortunate-
ly,   insufficient   attention  was  paid   to   the   effect   the   resulting  privilege  
might have on the fair trial rights of an accused. The fair trial rights of 
an accused include the right of an accused to examine, or have exam-
ined, the witnesses against him. That this right “is fundamental to the 
fairness”195 of international criminal proceedings is evidenced by the 
fact that it is provided for in the statutes governing the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the ICC.196 The right of an accused to examine, or have examined, 
the witnesses against him does not always equate to a right of cross-ex-
amination. However, it is clear that, when a statement is admitted into 
evidence in the absence of cross-examination, an accused is deprived of 
the opportunity to confront a witness against him and the international 
criminal tribunal hearing his case is deprived of the opportunity to as-
sess the witness’ credibility.197  
194  May & Wierda, supra  note 4 at 195.
195  May & Wierda, supra  note 4 at 284.
196  ICTY Statute, supra  note 5, art. 21(4)(e); ICTR Statute, supra  note 7, art. 
20(4)(e); ICC Statute, supra  note 9, art. 67(1)(e).
197  May & Wierda, supra  note 4 at 284-285.
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It is disconcerting that the Randal case contemplates, and has been 
relied  upon  to  find,  that  the  work  product  of  a  war  correspondent  (e.g.  
a newspaper article) can be admitted into evidence notwithstanding the 
fact that the war correspondent cannot be compelled to testify.198 When 
this occurs, there is a real possibility that, because the accused will be 
denied an opportunity to cross-examine the war correspondent, the fair-
ness of the international criminal proceedings will be brought into ques-
tion.199 It might be alleged, for example, that the international criminal 
tribunal has undermined the accused’s right to confront his accuser.200 
This problem is compounded by the fact that it appears that the rationale 
behind  the  qualified  testimonial  privilege  recognized  in  the  Randal  case  
is that war correspondents “serve a public interest in providing accurate 
information   from   a   conflict-­torn   area.”201 It thus looks as though the 
evidentiary value of the work product of war correspondents is being 
pre-judged to the accused’s detriment.202  
The suggestion made by the Appeals Chamber in the Randal case 
– that admitting the work product of a war correspondent into evidence 
in the absence of cross-examination will not necessarily prejudice the 
fair trial rights of an accused – is less than convincing. It is based upon 
the assumption that a Trial Chamber can be relied up to assign an appro-
priate amount of weight to an unsworn statement that the accused has 
not had an opportunity to challenge. This is a problematic assumption, 
particularly when one considers that the facts of a case before an inter-
national criminal tribunal are typically drafted by a legal assistant who 
has not been provided with “detailed instructions from the judges as to 
their assessment of the reliability of each piece of evidence and how it 
relates to the others.”203           
In light of the above, it is clear that the work product of a war cor-
respondent who is protected by the privilege created in the Randal case 
should not be admitted as evidence. The fact that an accused will be 
denied the opportunity to cross-examine a war correspondent should be 
198  Buchanan, supra  note 14 at 649.
199  Buchanan, supra  note 14 at 649.
200  Fairlie, supra  note 175 at 806.
201  Randal Trial Chamber Decision 2, supra  note 153 at para. 28.
202  Fairlie, supra  note 175 at 807.
203  Patricia M. Wald, “Rules of Evidence in the Yugoslav War Tribunal” (2003) 21 
Quinnipiac L.Rev. 761 at 772.
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enough to deprive the war correspondent’s work product of “so much of 
its probative value as to render it inadmissible.”204 Accordingly, in order 
to protect the fair trial rights of an accused, the testimonial privilege 
created in the Randal case should come with the proviso that the work 
product of any war correspondents it protects will not be admitted into 
evidence.
3. Extension of the Testimonial Privilege for War Correspondents 
Created in the Randal Case
Because the Appeals Chamber is shared by the ICTY and the ICTR, 
its decision in the Randal case will serve as a precedent for both tribu-
nals.205  Accordingly,   the   qualified   testimonial   privilege   created   in   the  
Randal case will be respected by the ICTR as well the ICTY. It is not at 
all certain, however, that war correspondents will be offered any protec-
tion from having their testimony compelled by the ICC. Although it is 
likely that the Randal case will be relied upon in proceedings before the 
ICC, it will have no binding effect on the permanent tribunal.206   
The issue of whether journalists, including war correspondents, 
should enjoy a privilege from testifying before the ICC was consid-
ered by those who drafted the ICC’s rules.207 Unfortunately, no con-
sensus was reached on the issue.208 As outlined earlier, the ICC’s rules 
regarding testimonial privileges in their present form seek only to pro-
tect  communications  made  in  the  context  of  confidential  relationships.  
The  qualified  testimonial  privilege  granted  to  war  correspondents  in  the  
Randal case is thus much more expansive than any testimonial privilege 
contemplated by the ICC’s rules.209 If the ICC judges opt to create a 
testimonial  privilege  for  war  correspondents  within  the  confines  of  the  
ICC’s  existing  rules,  the  privilege  will  only  protect  confidential  commu-
nications between war correspondents and their sources. Accordingly, it 
will be of little assistance to war correspondents like Randal, who are 
204  May & Weirda, supra  note 4 at 286.
205  Powles, supra  note 45 at 522.
206  Buchanan, supra  note 14 at 651.
207  Lieberman & Campbell, supra  note 67 at 13.
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reluctant  to  testify  about  sources  they  have  identified  and  materials  they  
have published.  
Of course, there is nothing in the rules governing the ICC that spe-
cifically  prohibit  it  from  adopting  of  the  qualified  privilege  for  war  cor-
respondents recognized in the Randal case.210 Although ICC judges are 
much more restricted in their ability to create new rules than judges 
of the ICTY and the ICTR are, they have been granted the power to 
develop new rules where the ICC’s existing rules “do not provide for a 
specific  situation”  that  comes  before  them.211 In light of the decision that 
was rendered in the Randal case, the issue of whether war correspond-
ents should be protected by a testimonial privilege will likely be raised 
proceedings before the ICC at some point in the future. As this issue is 
not addressed in the ICC’s existing rules, it is within the power of the 
ICC judges to create a new rule to address it. Whether the ICC judges 
should  adopt   the  qualified   testimonial  privilege  created   in   the  Randal  
case, however, is up for debate.  
In  light  of  the  flaws  in  the  Randal  case,  it  would  be  less  than  ideal  if  
the  qualified  testimonial  privilege  it  created  was  simply  adopted  by  the  
ICC. As it is uncertain that a testimonial privilege is needed to protect 
war  correspondents   from  being  compelled   to   testify   about  non-­confi-
dential   sources  and  materials,   it  might  very  well  be   sufficient   for   the  
ICC to recognize a testimonial privilege for war correspondents within 
the  confines  of  its  existing  rules.  Unlike  the  testimonial  privilege  rec-
ognized in the Randal case, such a privilege (which would only pro-
tect  confidential  communications  between  war  correspondents  and  their  
sources) would be in keeping with the theory that testimonial privileges 
should be narrowly construed. In addition, so long as it appropriately 
defined  who  ‘war  correspondents’  are,  such  a  privilege  would  be  suf-
ficiently  restrictive  to  prevent  the  floodgates  being  opened  to  a  host  of  
new testimonial privilege claims.  
In  order   to   avoid   the   adverse   consequences   that  might  flow   from  
routinely compelling war correspondents to testify before the ICC about 
non-­confidential  sources  and  materials,   the  ICC  judges  could  develop  
guidelines to assist them in exercising their discretion to subpoena 
war correspondents. Rather than imposing a strict test, as the Appeals 
210  Lieberman & Campbell, supra  note 67 at 13.
211  See ICC Statute, supra  note 9, art. 51.
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Chamber did in the Randal case, such guidelines could set out a variety 
of factors to be considered by an ICC judge contemplating compelling 
the testimony of a war correspondent. These factors might include: (1) 
the importance of the testimony sought from the war correspondent; 
(2) whether the information sought to be obtained from the war corre-
spondent might be obtained elsewhere; (3) whether protective measures 
could be provided to the war correspondent to alleviate some of the con-
cerns raised in the Randal case; and, (4) whether the fair trial rights of 
the  accused  would  be  sufficiently  respected  if  the  war  correspondent’s  
testimony was not compelled. Parallel guidelines could be created for 
the ICC prosecutors to assist them in exercising their discretion to seek 
subpoenas to compel the testimony of war correspondents.
CONCLUSION
The Randal case drew attention to the need to ensure that war corre-
spondents are not routinely compelled to testify before international 
criminal  tribunals.  The  qualified  testimonial  privilege  it  created,  how-
ever, overshot the mark and has the potential to give rise to many more 
problems than it sought to resolve. It is clear that international criminal 
tribunals should recognize a testimonial privilege that seeks to protect 
war   correspondents   from   a   compulsion   to   testify   about   confidential  
sources and materials. This was acknowledged by all of the parties to 
the Randal case and is supported by the efforts made by domestic and 
regional   tribunals   to  protect  confidential   journalistic   sources.  What   is  
not clear is whether a testimonial privilege is necessary to protect war 
correspondents  from  being  compelled  to  testify  about  non-­confidential  
sources and materials. As this paper illustrates, it seems that measures 
short  of  a  testimonial  privilege  might  be  sufficient  to  avoid  the  adverse  
consequences   that   could   flow   from   routinely   compelling   war   corre-
spondents to testify about such matters. Because testimonial privileges 
undermine the ability of international criminal tribunals to make factu-
ally  accurate  findings,   they   should  only  be   recognized   in   the  clearest  
of cases. Accordingly, while international criminal tribunals should be 
leery of issuing subpoenas to war correspondents when their testimony 
is unnecessary, they should not recognize a testimonial privilege to pro-
tect war correspondents from being compelled to testify about non-con-
fidential  sources  and  materials.        
